It is dated as of January 27, 2007. It says, ``Transition

Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraq Security Forces.''

It lays it out. This is what the American taxpayer has been

expending--an enormous sum of money for 2 1/2 years to train the Iraqi

forces. I bring to your attention, for the Ministry of Defense Forces:

the army, 132,700; air force, 900; the navy, 1,100; total, 134,700.

Ministry of Interior, trained and equipped: police, 135,000; national

police, 24,400; other MOI forces, 28,900; total, 188,300. That is a

total of 323,000 forces trained in the past 2\1/2\ years.

In the resolution my distinguished colleagues and I have put

together, we specifically say look at all options. I say the Iraqi's

are the ones who should be responsible for these problems in Baghdad.

We will give them support. We will give them the training. But I say to

my colleagues here in the Senate, this is what we have trained these

people to do. The Iraqi forces understand the language. They understand

the culture. How does an American GI, being thrust into the darkened

alleys of this city, with all of the crossfire between the Sunni and

the Shia, and Shia upon Shia decide whom to shoot, how to direct the

force?

The National Intelligence Estimate just released made mention of

this. The report states--I shall read it.

I say most respectfully to our President: Mr. President, recognize

what we have done in 2\1/2\ years to train these people. Let them take

the point. Let them take the brunt of the fight. And maybe we do not

need 21,500, together with support troops, to go in and do the job we

have trained these people to do themselves.

In this regard I would like to quote from T.E. Lawrence. This quote

is also cited in the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency. Lawrence

said:

Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also

describes a very complex conflict between all parties in Iraq. Putting

American soldiers in the midst of that will require military plans and

orders to contain exquisite tactical detail sufficient to afford our

men and women in uniform the ability to discern friend from foe in an

urban environment.

I, and others, also remain very concerned about the command and

control structure that has been planned for this operation in Baghdad.

In his January 10, 2007, address to the Nation, President Bush stated

that U.S. troops would be ``embedded'' in Iraqi formations. This left a

very serious question about the unity of command. On February 1,

General Casey described the command and control as `` a nonstandard

arrangement.'' This nonstandard arrangement must be clarified and our

resolution addresses this serious concern.

I yield the floor.

But it is not a part of the record so----

I feel very strongly that the Senate should work its will

on facts that are out in the open. I have filed my resolutions, one

after the other, at the desk so all Senators could have the benefit. Is

that a possibility, that we could have the benefit of this resolution?

And what time might the promise be executed?

I will be glad to give you my copy, but I feel it is

presumptuous of me to address it unless it is properly before the

Senate.

Madam President, clearly what is read is correct. But I

assure you that I forcefully argue that ours is in support of the

troops. There is no suggestion that one is less patriotic than the

other, if I may say to my dear friend.

Madam President, before the Senator yields, I would like

to associate myself with his remarks. I, too, have confidence in our

leadership being able to work this out accordingly. No matter how

strongly I feel about my resolution, I shall vote with our

distinguished leader on this issue and hope he can reconcile the

differences.